Minneapolis’ Somali experience may hold lessons for Toronto police - Somali Breaking News & Video Community

As Toronto police try to find and prosecute those responsible for shootings that left six young men of Somali descent dead in just four months, there could be lessons learned from Minneapolis police, whose recruitment strategies are helping bring down crime in that city’s Somali enclave.

All six men in Toronto were fatally shot since June, and only one arrest has been made — that of Christopher Husbands, who has been charged with murder in the death of Ahmed Hassan at the Eaton Centre on June 2.

Police and relatives of the other victims have made numerous pleas for information in those deaths, but there have been no breakthroughs.

Abdulle Elmi, whose cousin of the same name was shot and killed on July 5, wants answers.

“We want the community to come forward,” said Elmi, said, speaking of the approximately 18,500 people in the Toronto area of Somali origin.

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“It’s not a matter of the community not assisting the police, it’s more the community and the police not developing an understanding, cohesion or any form of trust to have a very constructive conversation about how to deal with these situations.”

Until about five years ago, Minneapolis was struggling with a similar problem among its large Somali-American community, a significant portion of which is concentrated in the Cedar-Riverside neighbourhood — also known as “The Motherland” — in the south of the city.

In mid-2006, the police force deployed Mohamed Abdullahi, an officer who came to the United States as a refugee in the 90s from Somalia, in south Minneapolis, including the Cedar-Riverside neighbourhood. He was joined in 2008 by another officer of Somali descent, Abdiwahab Ali.

Since 2007, several key crime statistics, including robberies, thefts, burglaries and aggravated assaults, dropped in the area. There were no homicides in the area in the past two years, although a triple homicide occurred in nearby Seward in 2010. And Minneapolis police are attributing the drop in crime in part to the efforts of the two officers.

“People thought: ‘Well, you have this large Somali population, and you really don’t understand them, and you know, they’ve got different cultural ethnicities or centrics that you really don’t understand. How could I as a Caucasian?’” said Richard Stanek, the sheriff of Hennepin County, where Minneapolis is located.

“What we’ve told them is it doesn’t matter which culture it is. Once you have that robust community outreach and you build those trusted partnerships and relationships, we fall back on our community-oriented policing philosophy and strategy in order to build those relationships with the community itself.”

‘It’s all about respect’

The team assigned to Cedar-Riverside, known to locals as officers Mo and Ali, walk the beat and patrol the neighbourhood in their cruisers. CBC News came along with the officers during their patrols in September, and the two displayed an intimate knowledge of the neighbourhood and a familiarity with its residents.

“You kind of humanize yourself. Later on they don’t see you as wearing blue, it’s like ‘Hey, what’s up guy?’ They’re more open to telling you stuff, because they’re more comfortable,” said Abdullahi, who lived in the area before joining the police department.

On one drive through the neighbourhood, Ali noticed what he believed was a new car parked on the street, which he identified as belonging to a suspected gang member who was arrested but never convicted on a murder charge.

A few minutes later, the officers come across the alleged gang member playing basketball. Speaking in Somali, the officers urge the men to stick to basketball for the day, which they said they would do.

“See how we’re having a regular conversation with him? That’s weird, yeah? But it’s all about respect. Nothing personal,” said Abdullahi.

And on another patrol of the neighbourhood, the officers are approached by a man who says he is willing to identify a gunman who fired shots in the area two nights earlier.

Speaking in Somali, he says he didn’t call 911 at the time, but he’s happy to give details to the two officers.

Increased enforcement not always the answer

One neighbourhood resident praised the two officers for turning around the area.

“They are good people. I think they are the neighbourhood’s saviours. They help out the neighbourhood a lot,” said Abdishakur Ahmed, who came to Minneapolis from Somalia 18 years ago and has family in Toronto.

“Before they came here, there was a lack of communication between the [Minneapolis police department] here and the young folks. Now we’ve come to an understanding and we can see the neighbourhood is really safe and is a good environment to walk around in.”

Police in Toronto also have a strategy to target troubled neighbourhoods. The Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy has teams of specially trained officers engage with high-crime neighbourhoods by day and conduct patrols and step up enforcement at night.

But Toronto police said they don’t keep track of the ethnic origin of their recruits, although police noted they do have a dedicated language line that callers who don’t speak English are directed to.

Flooding a neighbourhood with police, however, is not a tactic the Minneapolis police employ, although Stanek, the sheriff, says it helps to a degree when there has been a spate of crimes in the area.

“That is not the way to police a community or a particular ethnicity. And the reason is is because it’s very suppressive,” said Stanek.

Somalia’s Fragile Hope Is Linked to Ethiopia - Somali Breaking News & Video Community

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By Hassan Hussein — MINNEAPOLIS — No sooner had Somalia’s clan-appointed legislators elected a president, the first in more than 42 years in this Horn of Africa nation, than Kenyan troops dislodged the Islamist military group Al-Shabab from its last stronghold, the port town of Kismayo. As important a turnaround as this is, it hardly signals that two decades of anarchy have been overcome.

Although African Union troops have diminished Al-Shabab’s capabilities, this translates neither into its defeat nor increased legitimacy of the fledgling Somalian government. More importantly, a viable exit strategy is as elusive now as it has always been.

Moreover, the death in August of Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, architect of Somalia policy, presents both opportunities and dangers. Although the first official act of his successor, Hailemariam Desalegn, was to attend the swearing-in of Somali’s new president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud, he lacks sufficient footing within the Ethiopia’s military, security, and political establishments to wield real power. He also faces a host of mounting internal challenges, not least the growing discontent among Ethiopia’s restive Muslim population.

Somalia has long confounded the world. Numerous attempts to reconstruct a legitimate state have failed. Turning the current glimmer of hope into the dawn of a new beginning requires a departure from the well-travelled road of leaving the region’s interlocking web of insecurity unaddressed.

The unstable nature of the region’s security is a fitting metaphor to describe both the redrawing of Africa’s sacrosanct colonial borders and the birth of liberation movements.

Ethiopia is the geographic, demographic, political, and economic center of the Horn. It shares boundaries with each of the countries of the Horn: Somalia, Sudan, Kenya, Djibouti, Eritrea, and South Sudan. All major ethnic groups living elsewhere also live in Ethiopia. Its religious, ethnic, and linguistic diversity is unrivalled. As such, developments in Ethiopia reverberate throughout the region.

The nature of Ethiopia’s regime fuels Somalia’s instability. While making up a mere 5.8 percent of the population, the predominantly Orthodox Christian Tigreans maintain absolute monopoly over all levers of power. Despite its dominance, the Tigrean oligarchy is possessed by a pervasive sense of paranoia.

This plays out in projecting an aggressive stand against both domestic and foreign threats, real and imagined. The new prime minister, Hailemariam, is from an even smaller ethnic group, the Walayta, which comprises 2 percent of Ethiopia’s population of 94 million. His elevation to the premiership has not altered Ethiopia’s power equation.

Somalia’s troubles are far from over. How to fully integrate the south with the autonomous region of Puntland and the de facto independent state of Somaliland is not even broached. Reconstituting Somalia would be a staggering endeavor even in the best of circumstances. More so when that task is entrusted to the deeply insecure Tigrean minority elite that harbor a perennial fear of Somalia becoming a launching pad for Ethiopia’s opponents. This remains the weakest link in the Somalia strategy.

The strategy confronts Somali leaders with a perennial dilemma: On the one hand, to appeal to their compatriots and risk arousing the fear of external powers, mainly Ethiopia or, on the other hand, to gain Ethiopian sponsorship and alienate their base. The lot of Mohamoud is no different. The attempt on his life in September during a meeting in Mogadishu highlights the fragility of the situation.

Al Shabab’s defeat is necessary but insufficient for Somalia’s regeneration. Solving Ethiopia’s internal insecurities through democratization is also essential. Al-Shabab is a byproduct of Ethiopia’s 2006 disastrous intervention in Somalia.

What has Ethiopia’s democratization to do with stabilizing Somalia? Everything.

To an extent, today’s Ethiopia is analogous to apartheid South Africa of the 1980s. Growing domestic resistance in South Africa plus brutal cross-border operations by the military wing of ANC in Angola, Mozambique and Namibia was a nightmare scenario for the apartheid regime that led to increased domestic repression. Once democratic elections in 1994 ushered in majority rule under Nelson Mandela, the country ceased to be an exporter of instability.

As was the case with apartheid South Africa, Ethiopia’s stability is a facade bought at a stiff price—repression of domestic dissent and Somalia instability.

Zenawi’s death opens a window of opportunity. Unless the nexus between regime insecurity in Ethiopia and Somalia’s instability is seized upon, the African Union’s courageous efforts could be easily reversed—Al-Shabab and a plethora of clan militia wait on the wings to fill the vacuum should the effort falter.

Hassen Hussein teaches courses on leadership and decision-making at the Minneapolis campus of Saint Mary’s University. He contributes to the website opride.com. He can be reached athxhussein@gmail.com.

Assessing Turkey’s Role in Somalia - Somali Breaking News & Video Community

OVERVIEW

Turkey is the newest country to intervene in Somalia and its involvement has produced some positive results. Prime

Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s courageous visit to Mogadishu in August 2011 at the height of the famine and his decision to open an embassy gave fresh impetus to efforts to establish lasting peace. Widespread Somali gratitude for Turkish humanitarian endeavours and the country’s status as a Muslim and democratic state established Turkey as a

welcome partner. Ankara has signalled it is in for the long haul. However, it must tread prudently, eschew unilateralism and learn lessons to avoid another failed international intervention. Over twenty years, many states and entities have tried to bring relief and secure peace in Somalia, often leaving behind a situation messier than that which they found.
Turkey’s presence on the ground is relatively small, but because of its timely famine relief and the apparent strength of its commitment, as well as Somalis’ gratitude, its contribution is seen as colossal. In addition to its embassy, there are about a dozen governmental and non-gov­ern­men­tal organisations (NGOs) with a limited presence on the ground working in Mogadishu. But Somalis’ dream of a quick and comprehensive recovery has created great expectations in the regions that are not receiving Turkish assistance, particularly because of their highly visible activities in Mogadishu. Yet, besides generous diplomatic and political support, its means are modest and its material support to Somalia will probably remain limited. If the Somali people’s high expectations are not moderated and if Ankara is unable to expand its relief and development aid to peaceful regions outside Mogadishu, the Turkey-Somalia partnership could be strained or quickly transformed into a relationship beset by resentment.Ankara must appreciate it alone cannot solve the country’s many challenges, but must secure the support and cooperation of both the Somali people and international community. Trying to go solo could backfire, hamper ongoing efforts and lose the immense good-will it has accumulated.

Vocal Somali criticism of the two conferences (civil society and government) held in Istanbul from late May to early June 2012 should serve as an important reminder about the volatility of and multiple fault lines in Somali politics. Somalia’s main political actors backpedalled on clear political understandings they had with Ankara (such as the traditional elders’ planned trip to Istanbul to participate in the civil society gathering) and openly criticised and confronted their host on seemingly benign issues. Turkey overcame these unexpected impediments because of diplomatic insights gained from its on-the-ground presence and support from international partners. It should use its new experience to build consensus and improve external coordination if its intervention is to be effective.

As a new Somali government is established, Turkey is expected to, and can, play an important role in helping stabilise and develop the war-ravaged country. In order to play a major and sustained role in Somalia, Ankara should:

• lay out a public, clear and realistic long-term strategy for its Somalia policy, backed by secure funding and an increase in the number of specialists in both Mogadishu and Ankara dedicated to its efforts in Somalia, and in particular build up its knowledge of Somalia and coordinate with other countries and international agencies active in the country;
• remain impartial in internal politics and avoid being manipulated by Somali politicians long experienced in outwitting foreign newcomers;
• expand targeted assistance to peaceful regions outside of Mogadishu;
• prioritise institution building and knowledge transfer, including investing in the return of educated diaspora Somalis;
• help with political party development, constitutional reform and the creation of accountable institutions;
• take a more active role in UN peacebuilding efforts;
• manage Somali expectations of how much assistance it can provide;
• establish a standardised and transparent bidding process for contracts and subcontracts to avoid empowering predatory businesspeople;
• offer mediation expertise and financial assistance to peace and reconciliation efforts;
• stop being indifferent to the endemic Somali corruption and tie diplomatic and development assistance to upholding the rule of law and establishing accountable and effective institutions;
• provide more support to AMISOM and integrate security assistance within existing international mechanisms, rather than embarking on a parallel and duplicate process;
• help Somalia create a professional, decentralised police force, which, rather than external forces such as AMISOM, will be responsible for the consolidation of peace and security;
• coordinate with other countries and international agencies to prevent overlap and ensure aid is provided strategically;
• ensure Turkish businesspeople operating in Somalia neither exploit vulnerable Somalis nor are exploited by Somali elite; and
• support the Joint Financial Management Board agreed to at the London and Istanbul conferences to ensure that government revenue and international assistance is used appropriately and efficiently.

This briefing outlines Turkey’s ongoing operations and achievements so far. As Somalia enters a new and uncertain post-transition phase, Ankara may likely face obstacles and will run into the country’s complicated political and security environment in delivering on numerous expectations as its honeymoon with Somalis ends. To avoid this, the briefing suggests practical steps to make the Turkish-Somalia cooperation sustainable and mutually beneficial.

Al-Shabab Bans Islamic Aid Organization « VOA Breaking News

Somali militant group al-Shabab has banned an aid group from the shrinking but still significant area under its control.

The militants said in a series of Twitter messages Monday that they have revoked permits for London-based Islamic Relief. Al-Shabab said the aid group was “covertly extending the operations” of other organizations it has banned, particularly the United Nations World Food Program.

In a statement, Islamic Relief said it has not been officially notified of any decision to revoke its license. It said none of its programs are funded by the WFP.

After losing the port city of Kismayo last week, al-Shabab no longer controls any major towns in Somalia, but it continues to hold rural areas and roads that connect population centers.

African Union forces fighting the militants said Sunday that they and Somali government troops had captured the town of Wanla Weyn from al-Shabab and secured a nearby airbase.

The AU force said it has begun an offensive aimed at clearing al-Shabab from the area between Afgooye, west of Mogadishu, and the town of Baidoa.

Al-Shabab, which has an alliance with al-Qaida, once controlled most of southern and central Somalia and imposed a strict version of Islamic law on the population. But over the past two years, the group has lost most of its territory to combined AU, Kenyan, Ethiopian and Somali government forces.

Al Shabaab After Kismayo | Critical Threats

By Katherine Zimmerman

October 3, 2012

Al Qaeda’s affiliates across Africa – Somalia’s al Shabaab, Nigeria’s Boko Haram, and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb – have apparently been increasingly seeking to coordinate their efforts.[1]The United States would face an al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist network that stretches across Africa if those efforts succeed. Al Shabaab has suffered major setbacks over the past year, including the September 28 loss of a major stronghold in the southern Somali port city of Kismayo, but the group has not been defeated. The fall of Kismayo could herald the collapse of the group’s quasi-state, but it may also serve to strengthen more radical factions within the terrorist group that prefer to focus on regional and global jihad. It will also strain the weak alliance of regional states and local groups, such as Kenya, Ethiopia, and their proxies, whose unifying interest has been the fight against al Shabaab and not a long-term vision for Somalia, over which they disagree. The fight against al Shabaab is not over in Somalia and now is not the time to declare victory; instead, now is the time to ensure that recent achievements last.

Click to enlarge Kismayo map.

Al Shabaab’s quasi-state in southern and central Somalia has been progressively reduced over the past thirteen months. Last August, the group suddenly vacated Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital, announcing a tactical shift from holding ground to guerilla-type warfare.[2] Ugandan and Burundian peacekeeping troops in Mogadishu, operating under the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) mandate, secured their newly-gained positions in Mogadishu and continued to push outward against al Shabaab. Kenya, increasingly concerned by al Shabaab’s reach from Somalia south into its own territory, launched Operation Linda Nchi in October 2011.[3] That operation led Ethiopia to deploy forces into the major population centers in central Somalia and along its borders as well. By spring 2012, Kenyan troops were being incorporated into AMISOM, and planning was in place to capture Kismayo.

Operation Sledge Hammer, the AMISOM-led offensive to take Kismayo, began early the morning of September 28 with an amphibious landing on beaches just north of the city.[4] Increasing military activity preceded the operation, however.[5] Kenyan warships and airstrikes targeted known al Shabaab positions around the city, including what the Kenyan military described as an “armory” at the Kismayo airport. Kenyan planes also dropped leaflets on September 27 warning civilians to evacuate the city. When Kenyan and Somali government troops advanced on the city the following day, they met little resistance during their approach. Throughout the day, Kenyan jets and helicopters provided air support, targeting al Shabaab positions. Significantly, Kenya claims that airstrikes killed senior al Shabaab officials Sheikh Hassan Yaqub Ali and Sheikh Abdikarim Adow.[6] Al Shabaab withdrew from the city and now the Somali government flag flies over symbolic sites of control, such as the airport.[7]

The fall of Kismayo, which served as al Shabaab’s operational and financial hub, is an important step toward defeating al Shabaab. Al Shabaab had allied with local Islamist militias in August 2008 to seize control of Kismayo and has held it since. Despite the withdrawal, it is not clear that the group has fully relinquished the idea of controlling the area, although it is unlikely that it will be able to re-establish itself there to the same degree as before. Al Shabaab spokesman Ali Mohamed Rage, also known as Ali Dhere, warned, “The enemies have not yet entered the town. Let them enter Kismayo, which will soon turn into a battlefield.”[8] As AMISOM troops moved into Kismayo, an explosion hit one of the administration office buildings, which al Shabaab’s military spokesman Sheikh Abdi Aziz Abu Mus’ab called a portent of what was to come.[9] Indirectly, high-casualty rates among the Kenyan contingent deployed in Kismayo could affect AMISOM’s strength, which rests on troops contributions from regional countries. The Kenyan public may pressure its government to limit or end direct military support for AMISOM.  At the moment, however, it appears unlikely that al Shabaab will be more successful in driving AMISOM out of Kismayo than it has been in similar efforts in and around Mogadishu.

The question of who will fill the power vacuum in Kismayo now comes to the fore, however. The alliance between pro-government factions is not strong, and rests primarily on mutual interests in defeating al Shabaab. Interests vary widely and, in many cases, conflict apart from that goal. It is extremely likely that local clan militias will vie for control of the city, a central hub for Somalia’s lucrative charcoal industry, to gain access to its resources. These clan militias receive support from Kenya and Ethiopia. Kenya has supported an Ogadeni militia, whose leaders very likely see this as an opportunity to gain power in Somalia. The Ogadeni clan also constitutes the majority of members of a rebel group in Ethiopia, the Ogaden National Liberation Front. Ethiopia, therefore, might be concerned should the Ogadenis gain power in Somalia. The clans in Kismayo have resisted Ogadeni attempts to control Kismayo in the recent past, choosing instead to support al Shabaab. Conflict over Kismayo does not bode well either for the fight against al Shabaab, which will require continued cooperation between pro-government factions, or for the stabilization of the country.

Al Shabaab as an organization will likely have to adapt after the loss of the city. The fall of Kismayo may intensify divisions within the group’s leadership over whether al Shabaab should pursue a national agenda to establish an Islamic state in Somalia or whether al Shabaab should pursue a regional, or global, agenda of jihad.[10] There is already evidence that al Shabaab leaders focused on establishing an Islamic state in Somalia are beginning to splinter away from the group. Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, formerly a leader of an Islamist militia called Hizb al Islam and now a senior leader in al Shabaab, has publicly distanced himself from some of al Shabaab’s more radical positions over the past year. More recently, rumors have circulated that Hizb al Islam has defected from al Shabaab, though this has been contested.[11] The core leaders who believe in regional and global jihad will be strengthened should these nationalist leaders continue to peel away from the group. Resources that would otherwise be devoted toward financing a local fighting force and governing areas could instead go toward funding terrorist operations. Though the overall strength of the group may be weakened, the resolve of its leaders to pursue regional and global jihad has not been weakened.

---

[1] U.S. AFRICOM Commander General Carter Ham discusses African Security Issues at Africa Center for Strategic Studies Senior Leaders Seminar on June 26, 2012. Transcript available here:http://www.africom.mil/getarticle.asp?art=8039

[2] Katherine Zimmerman, “Al Shabaab’s Withdrawal from Mogadishu,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, August 7, 2011. Available: http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/zimmerman-shabaab-retreat-mogadishu-august-7-2011

[3] For further information on the Kenyan operation, see Katherine Zimmerman and Kennan Khatib, “Timeline: Operation Linda Nchi,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, October 24, 2011. Last updated March 9, 2012. Available:http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/timeline-operation-linda-nchi-october-24-2011

[4] Jeffrey Gettleman, “Last Somali Militant Bastion Falls, Kenya Claims,” New York Times, September 28, 2012. Available: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/29/world/africa/kenya-says-it-captures-last-islamist-bastion-in-somalia.html

[5] See the Gulf of Aden Security Review reports by AEI’s Critical Threats Project for the week preceding the operation. These are available: http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/gulf-aden-security-review

[6] Abdi Sheikh and Feisal Omar, “Somalia’s al Shabaab Rebels Pull out of Kismayu Bastion,” Reuters, September 29, 2012. Available: http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE88S00320120929

[7] See AMISOM’s Flickr feed of AMISOM at Kismayo Airport (http://www.flickr.com/photos/au_unistphotostream/sets/72157631681544662/).

[8] “Somalia Islamists Abandon Kismayo Amid AU Attack,” BBC, September 29, 2012. Available:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19769058

[9] Abdi Sheikh, “Update 3-Somali Militants Hit Kismayu as African Troops Move In,” Reuters, October 2, 2012. Available: http://af.reuters.com/article/somaliaNews/idAFL6E8L2C0T20121002

[10] For more on al Shabaab’s leadership, see Katherine Zimmerman, “Al Shabaab in Decline?” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, May 8, 2012. Available: http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/zimmerman-al-shabaab-in-decline-may-8-2012

[11] See the press release from al Shabaab’s military commander Sheikh Abdi Aziz Abu Mus’ab, issued on September 28, 2012. The English translation is available here: http://jihadology.net/2012/09/27/new-press-release-from-%E1%B8%A5arakat-al-shabab-al-mujahidins-shaykh-abu-mu%E1%B9%A3ab-abd-al-aziz-about-the-allegations-of-the-split-of-%E1%B8%A5izb-al-islam-from-al-shabab/

Ethiopia: Further Support to Somalia

The course of situations is now changing for the better in Somalia.

Known to all, Somalia has been in chaos for over a decade owing to different factors. One of the factors was the shortsighted move and obstinacy of the war lords on how to resolve the daunting situation in that country. The other difficulty was the infiltration of terrorists and fundamentalists to exploit the trouble in this war torn country to realize their agendas. As a result, Somalia has been a haven ground for such forces like Al-Ithad, Al-Qaida and Al-Shabaab. These terrorist groups have been exhaustively engaged not only in sustaining the suffering of the Somali people due to lack of peace but also destabilizing the Horn Region and areas beyond. Terrorist attacks in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Ethiopia in the last two decades are clear testimony to the fact.

As a matter of fact, the international community, AU being the main actor, has taken different measures to reinstate Somalia as a country. Neighbouring countries also have tried to pacify this troubled nation through different initiatives. Ethiopia has been at a forefront to normalize the situation in Somalia by assisting the recently relinquished Transitional Government in all means possible.

Now, fortunately, these efforts have borne fruit resulting in helping the establishment of a permanent government in Somalia. However, this success is not the end of the story. The new government still needs support from all peace loving corners and from the neighbouring countries in particular. Moreover, it is highly important to put an end to the Al-Qaida linked terrorist group Al-Shabaab if peace and security is to reign in Somalia.

Ethiopia's position is always consistent with regard to peace and security in Somalia. There is no hidden agenda behind this stand. It is the most affected neighbouring country if turmoil continues to prevail in this sisterly country. Ethiopia and Somalia are linked geographically, historically, culturally, linguistically and genealogically. Therefore, any good or bad incident happening in Somalia affects Ethiopia directly or indirectly. The spillover is, undoubtedly, immense.

Hence, Ethiopia appreciates steps taken by AMISOM to carry off Al-Shabaab and strengthen the legally established government in Somalia. Towards that end also, it will play a positive role in the frame work of AU decisions and its operation in Somalia.

Two Kenyan police shot dead near Somalia border | Reuters

Two police officers were shot dead in Kenya on Sunday in the northern town of Garissa close to the border with Somalia, police said, hours after a child was killed in a grenade attack on a church in Nairobi.

Kenya has been hit by a series of grenade and gun attacks since it sent troops into Somalia last October in pursuit of Islamist al Shabaab militants whom it blamed for kidnapping its security personnel and Western tourists.

The killing of the police officers and the attack on the church came days after Kenyan troops launched a surprise offensive on the southern Somali port of Kismayu, al Shabaab's last stronghold, forcing the rebels to flee.

Most of the inhabitants of Garissa, where the police officers were shot, are ethnic Somalis and the town is located only 180 km (111 miles) from Kenya's border with Somalia.

Herman Ndiema, Garissa's deputy police chief, told Reuters the two officers were killed as they walked to a technical college they had been assigned to guard. Their killers drove up to them in a taxi, shot them dead, and then jumped out to steal their guns, he said.

"We suspect sympathizers of the al Shabaab militant group were behind the attack and we have sealed all exit routes to nab them," Ndiema said.

The stolen guns, G3 rifles, were later recovered a short distance from the scene of the attack, a regional administrator said. Security was stepped up in the town with members of the security forces patrolling it by car.

Earlier in the day, a nine-year-old boy was killed and three other children wounded when a hand grenade was thrown into a Sunday school session in a church in the capital Nairobi, police and medical staff said.

Police said attackers threw the grenade into the Sunday school service in St. Polycarp's church on Nairobi's Juja Road.

The grenade exploded, spraying the children with shrapnel and fatally injuring the boy.

"We suspect this blast might have been carried out by sympathizers of al Shabaab," said Charles Owino, a police spokesman.

"These are the kicks of a dying horse since, of late, Kenyan police have arrested several suspects in connection with grenades," he said.

Police had warned there was a heightened risk of attacks soon after the Kenya Defence Force led an assault against the rebels in Kismayu under cover of darkness on Thursday, local newspapers said on Sunday.

They said police had found bomb making equipment in a bag on a bus carrying passengers from Garissa to Nairobi on Friday. All 60 passengers on board had been detained after no one admitted ownership of the bag, the papers said.

Masked assailants launched simultaneous gun and grenade raids on two churches in Garissa in July, killing at least 17 people. (Additional reporting and writing by Duncan Miriri in Nairobi; Editing by Andrew Osborn)